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The Role of Task and Process Conflict in Strategizing 
The implementation of strategic initiatives is central to organizational success (Balogun & 
Johnson, 2004; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2003). Recent studies show that implementation does not 
simply operationalize and execute strategy, but also results in subtle adjustments or explicit 
reformulations of strategy content (Sminia & de Rond, 2012; Vaara & Whittington, 2012). Strategy 
implementation is thus central to effective strategizing. Yet, strategy implementation is complex, 
partially because it is critically affected by human dynamics like resistance (Courpasson et al, 2013), 
politics (Whittle et al, 2013) and tension (Jarzabkowski et al, 2013). Rather than indicators of failure, 
such dynamics are an integral part of how organizations negotiate multiple goals (Denis et al, 2001, 
2007; Johnson et al, 2003) and can improve the quality of strategy (Normann, 1977; Pettigrew, 
1977). It is thus important to understand the human dynamics underlying strategy implementation. 
While strategy scholars have studied the role of dynamics such as resistance, politics, and 
tensions during strategy implementation, little focus has been put on conflict. This is surprising as (i) 
conflict is specifically about incompatibility of goals, processes and relationships (De Dreu and 
Gelfand, 2008; Jehn and Bendersky, 2003), which are central to strategy implementation; (ii) conflict 
significantly impacts organizational outcomes such as performance (De Wit et al., 2012) and helps 
develop organizational capability (Danneels, 2008; Hinthorne, 1996); (iii) all organizations are 
affected by conflict to some degree (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008); and (iv) conflict often precedes 
resistance, politics and tensions (Courpasson et al, 2013; Jarzabkowski et al, 2013; Whittle et al, 
2013). Hence, conflict is a critical dynamic for strategist to understand. 
The few studies explicitly investigating conflict in the strategy process tend to focus on 
formulation by studying strategic decisions (e.g. Amason, 1996; Amason & Schweiger, 1994; 
Eisenhardt, 1999; Eisenhardt et al, 1997). Such studies show that conflict leads to increased scrutiny 
of information and, consequently, better decisions (Eisenhardt, 1999; Kellermanns et al, 2008; 
Mooney et al, 2007). There has been little attention to conflict during strategy implementation 
(exceptions: Floyd & Lane, 2000; Regnér, 2003). Conflict is likely to impact implementation but do 
not know how. That is our focus. 
Employing a strategizing perspective, we theorize the role of human dynamics in strategy 
implementation, focusing on conflict. We then investigate these ideas in a detailed longitudinal study 
of implementing a strategy in real-time, highlighting the importance of task and process conflict. Our 
study shows that the interaction of task and process conflict, and the responses this interaction 
evokes, enables strategy to emerge as actors implement it. Both conflict types enable actors to 
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identify strategy problems, but the recursive relationship between them is critical in iteratively 
shaping the emergence of strategy content and process. Managers iterate back and forth between 
strategy process and strategy content issues as they experience and respond to process and task 
conflict. This iteration is critical, as actors cannot define all strategy content and process in advance 
and must follow an incremental, process-based feedback loop, identifying and resolving problems as 
these emerge during implementation. We contribute to understanding of how strategy content 
emerges during implementation. Specifically, we show that conflict is revelatory of the emergent 
process of strategy implementation and thus integral to how managers strategize in practice. 
A Strategizing Perspective 
This paper adopts a strategizing perspective, which implies a focus on “the detailed processes 
and practices which constitute the day-to-day activities of organizational life and which relate to 
strategic outcomes” (Johnson et al, 2003: 3). In line with the turn toward practice in organization 
studies (Orlikowski, 1992, 2000; Schatzki et al, 2001), this requires shifting focus away from 
strategy as a static input or output toward strategy as a dynamic set of activities enacted by 
individuals (Jarzabkowski, 2005). Strategizing has important implications for how we view and study 
strategy (Johnson et al, 2003; Jarzabkowski et al, 2007). First, it emphasises micro-activities, i.e. 
what people in organizations do when they do strategy, thereby giving critical importance to 
everyday human dynamics like information-sharing, coordination and conflict (McGrath & Argote, 
2001). These are seen as central to strategizing due to their link to strategic outcomes like firm 
direction and survival (Jarzabkowski et al, 2007). 
Second, strategizing encourages a broader definition of strategists by demonstrating that 
middle managers are central in shaping strategy (e.g. Balogun, 2003; Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 
2005; Mantere, 2005; Regnér, 2003; Rouleau, 2005). This suggests that strategy, once formulated, is 
not stable, shifting attention from strategy formulation toward implementation. Since the seminal 
work of Mintzberg (1978; & Waters, 1985) and Pettigrew (1985; 1987), we know that strategy 
content emerges through implementation and, hence, is inimically entwined with the processes that 
produced it. Strategy making is thus an emergent process (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006; 
Tsoukas, 2010; Vaara & Whittington, 2012) and working out strategy content is messy, incremental 
and continuous (Bartunek, Balogun & Do, 2011). Thus, we are called to study the social mechanisms 
that explain the relationship between strategy process and content (Sminia & de Rond, 2012); we 
propose conflict as one such mechanism. 
Conflict is likely to be central to strategizing because strategy is complex and ambiguous 
(Denis, Langley & Rouleau, 2007; Sillince et al, 2012), creating the potential for disagreement over 
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what the strategy is and how it should be implemented. Indeed, conflict is a common occurrence in 
strategy processes (Amason, 1996; Eisenhardt et al, 1997) due to the plurality of strategic roles and 
activities (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007; Westley, 
1990). We thus need to understand conflict in strategy implementation. 
Strategy Implementation: Tensions, Politics & Resistance 
While strategy implementation studies often only address conflict indirectly, they commonly 
study related topics like resistance, politics and tensions. Focusing on the human dynamics that 
underpin strategizing, such work may assist our understanding of the role of social dynamics like 
conflict in strategy implementation. Indeed, resistance, politics and tension often precede conflict. 
For instance, resisting a dominant direction may result from conflict over a task or process (Floyd & 
Lane, 2000). Similarly, political behaviour often occurs in response to conflict: “The political 
decision process can be understood in part as the resolution of conflicting demands” (Pettigrew, 
1977: 82; also Baldridge, 1971; March, 1962; Pfeffer, 1981). Equally, tensions may the result of 
contradictions being made salient through confrontation (Jarzabkowski et al, 2013). These studies 
highlight the importance of human dynamics for strategy outcomes.  
The resistance to change literature illuminates the role of social dynamics in strategy 
implementation. Resistance generally refers to an action (Brower & Abolafia, 1995) that is not 
aligned with the dominant direction or status quo. Resistance is inherent to organizations (Thompson 
& Ackroyd, 1995) and can produce both positive and negative outcomes (Courpasson et al, 2012). 
While much literature still views resistance as “an adversarial and antagonistic process” that may 
waylay strategy (Courpasson et al, 2012: 801), resistance can also positively influence management 
decisions and so generate constructive change (Courpasson & Dany, 2009; Courpasson, Dany & 
Clegg, 2012; Thomas & Hardy, 2011). This has resulted in theorizing about positive (Piderit, 2000) 
and productive resistance (Courpasson & Dany, 2009). This suggests that ‘resisters’ may introduce 
new ideas (cf. Ford et al, 2008; Piderit, 2000), thereby positively altering decisions of strategy-
makers and, so, the path of strategy (Regnér, 2003).  
Micro-politics of strategy further illuminate social dynamics of strategizing (cf. Pettigrew, 
1977). Politics are “the observable, but often covert, actions by which executives enhance their 
power to influence decisions” (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988: 737). Strategic decision-making is a 
political process; which issues are attended to and which action adopted depends on how power is 
mobilized (Pettigrew, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974). Political activity is common in organizations 
(Rosen et al, 2013; Whittle et al, 2013) but can be counterproductive by focusing activities on 
internal power dynamics rather than external market issues, leading to in-fighting and potentially 
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delaying strategic decisions and actions. Conversely, politics can be productive; for instance, 
ensuring there is appropriate questioning of strategic decisions and actions to secure the best 
organizational outcome (Johnson, 1992; Whittle et al, 2013).  
Work on organizational tensions casts light on the social dynamics inherent in strategizing. 
‘Tension’ bridges the literature on dialectics, paradox and contradiction, emphasizing organizations’ 
need to balance multiple contradictory pressures (Crossan & Hurst, 2006; Lewis, 2000). 
Contradictions present in organizational life include cooperation vs. competition, rigidity vs. 
flexibility, and short-term vs. long-term goals (Das & Teng, 2000). Tensions can be negative, leading 
to either/or trade-offs and suboptimal strategizing via suppression of one pole (Lewis, 2000). Yet 
tension can also be positive when organizational actors are able to transcend and work across 
different forces in a both/and fashion (Lewis, 2000). Positive outcomes of tensions are often 
achieved via improvisation, which is the “creative and spontaneous process of trying to achieve an 
objective in a new way” (Vera & Crossan, 2005: 205; also Crossan & Hurst, 2006). To fully 
appreciate strategy implementation, it is thus important to understand such dynamics. 
Existing Work on Social Dynamics of Strategizing 
The bodies of work reviewed above highlight the importance of social dynamics during 
strategizing and help understand the potential implications of conflict on strategizing. They outline 
the importance of studying human micro-dynamics in understanding how destructive and generative 
potential is created. Thus, we expect some similarity between how conflict and these other dynamics 
function in strategy implementation.  
Yet, there are also likely to be important differences as conflict is distinct from resistance, 
politics and tensions. Unlike resistance, conflict neither assumes divergence from a dominant 
direction, nor a change context; conflict may arise between equally powerful and legitimate interests 
during relative stability. Further, conflict may occur without politics, as it is not necessarily based in 
power and influence but rather focuses on tasks, processes and relationships (Befahr et al., 2011). 
Conflict also implies disagreement, not contradiction; while disagreement suggests active salience of 
differences between groups, tensions may lie dormant. Conflict is thus more common and impactful. 
However, despite the relative importance of conflict in strategy processes, work on 
strategizing and conflict has evolved independently with few exceptions (e.g. Amason, 1996; 
Eisenhardt et al, 1997; Kellermanns, 2008; Mooney et al, 2007). Consequently, strategy has 
overlooked a vast array of empirical and theoretical resources. Our paper addresses this oversight. 
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The Role of Conflict in Strategy Implementation  
Conflict refers to incompatibility, discrepancy or disagreement between individuals or groups 
in relation to goals, processes and relationships (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008; Jehn & Bendersky, 
2003). It often arises as people from different divisions and specialisms advance a joint task (Pruitt, 
2008). While acknowledging conflict as important, the strategy literature often only studies it 
indirectly, creating a void of systematic strategy research on conflict. The modest work that has been 
conducted indicates that conflict may play an important role in strategy implementation.  
Research suggests that conflict may arise from different interpretations of strategy (Balogun 
& Johnson, 2004; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Ketokivi & Castañer, 2004; Meyer, 2006; Westley, 1990; 
Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989). Interpretations may generate disagreement as people come together to 
achieve goals (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Westley, 1990; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989), and produce 
ambiguity about action, increase opportunistic behaviour, lower the quality of information shared, 
reduce trust, hinder change, and lead individuals to work cross-purpose (Floyd & Lane, 2000). 
Conflict may also have beneficial effects by uncovering disparity in perceptions, interpretations, and 
practices (Floyd & Lane, 2000), heightening information scrutiny (Ford et al., 2008), and aligning 
decisions with organizational interest (Ford et al., 2008). For instance, Régner (2003) shows that 
conflict can mobilize managers into taking action.  
While these strategy studies indicate the significance of conflict in strategy implementation, 
they cannot explain how effects are generated. Mixed results highlight the need to further understand 
the role of conflict during strategy implementation through a more fine-grained approach. We turn to 
conflict studies for theoretical and empirical tools. 
Conflict as a Lens to Unpack Strategy Implementation  
Despite little direct attention from strategy scholars, conflict studies have a long history 
within management (Crozier, 1964; Pondy, 1967; Walton, 1967). The dominant focus has been on 
group conflict (Jehn & Mannix, 2001; March & Simon, 1958), as organizations consist of groups 
with different aims and methods that are interdependent and share macro-goals (Walton, 1967). 
These competing values provide fertile ground for conflict (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). How conflict 
is enacted and dealt with is critical for organizational success (Pruitt, 2008). While conflict was 
traditionally seen as something to be eradicated (Crozier, 1964; Pondy, 1967), new 
conceptualizations position conflict as a natural part of human interaction (Jehn & Mannix, 2001; 
Martin & Bergman, 1996; Pruitt, 2008). Conflict can have positive and negative effects depending on 
its nature (cf. De Wit et al., 2012). Two types of conflict – task and process conflict – are particularly 
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relevant to strategy implementation, as they centre on task-related issues1. Both types can evoke 
positive and negative effects (Behfar, Peterson, Mannix & Trochim, 2008).  
Task conflict is disagreement about the content and outcomes of a task; i.e. what the task is 
(Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Shaw et al., 2011). This conflict arises from discrepancy between task-
based values, needs or interests. Examples include discrepant views about goals or key performance 
indicators. Task conflict can lead to poorer information processing (Carnevale & Probst, 1998) and 
reduce group effectiveness, creativity and decision-making (De Dreu, 2006). However, it may also 
improve task criticality (Amason, Thompson, Hochwater & Harrison, 1995; Nemeth, 1995), 
innovation (De Dreu, 2006; De Dreu & West, 2001), task commitment and member satisfaction 
(Behfar, Mannix, Peterson & Trochim, 2011). This potential for benefit means task conflict is 
labelled the most constructive form of conflict (De Wit et al., 2011). Task conflict is interesting to 
strategists, as it speaks to core strategy issues: The content and outcomes of tasks. Conflict around 
strategy content is thus likely to arise during strategy implementation (Regnér, 2003). 
Process conflict is disagreement about task logistics like delegation and role assignment; i.e. 
how the task should be accomplished (Jehn, 1997; Shaw et al., 2011). Examples comprise 
disagreement about who should lead a project or what constitute key milestones. Detrimental effects 
are commonly reported (de Wit et al., 2012), especially if process conflict is high (Jehn, 1997). Such 
conflict may hamper group functioning (Greer, Jehn & Mannix, 2008) and viability (Thatcher, Jehn 
& Zamutto, 2003; Vodosek, 2007), distract from task accomplishment (Jehn, 1995), and reduce 
productivity (Jehn et al., 1999). Yet, low levels can have positive impacts like clarified roles, agreed 
resource use, and suitable plans and timelines (e.g., Jehn & Bendersky, 2003; Jehn & Mannix, 2001). 
Process conflict is relevant to strategy, involving issues like deadline agreement (Goncalo, Pollman 
& Maslach, 2010), role/task allocation (Karn, 2008), and time management (Karn, 2008; Kurtzberg 
& Mueller, 2005), which underpin the coordinating and scheduling work of strategy implementation. 
As implementation is often characterized by resource issues and contested assignment of 
responsibilities (e.g. Floyd & Lane, 2000; Jarzabkowski & Balogun, 2009), process conflict is likely. 
This suggests that it matters which conflict takes place. Longitudinal studies of conflict 
(Greer et al., 2008) propose that it also matters when conflict occurs (Goncalo et al., 2010; Greer et 
                                                 
1
 We exclude relationship and status conflict from our analysis. We exclude relationship conflict because (1) it is 
difficult to identify in observational data, as organizational norms often prohibit the expression of relationship 
conflict (Behfar et al., 2008), (2) there are few qualitative studies that offer detailed guidance on how to reliably 
identify and code relationship conflict, and (3) preliminary coding of our data provided little evidence of such 
conflict. We exclude status conflict (cf. Bendersky and Hays, 2012) as (1) it was only recently identified and there is 
insufficient research to justify including it and (2) we did not identify the presence of status conflict in early coding. 
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al., 2008). Early work suggests high performing teams experience low but increasing levels of 
process conflict and moderate task conflict at midpoint (Jehn & Mannix, 2001). Comparison with 
lower performers confirms that conflict fluctuates over time, though the pattern is different; these 
groups experience higher process conflict at the start and end of projects and high task conflict at the 
end (Jehn & Mannix, 2001). These studies indicate the need to trace conflict patterns if we are to 
better understand the role of conflict. In strategy implementation, we thus need to consider which 
conflict type occurs when. 
Additionally, conflict types can interact, with one type morphing into or stimulating another 
(cf. Jehn, 1997). For instance, process conflict may lead to task conflict as disagreement about task 
execution interferes with task accomplishment (Greer et al., 2008) or deters from critical discussions 
and implementation (Jehn, Northcraft & Neale, 1999). Similarly, task conflict may lead to process 
conflict, as discrepant views about goals produces disagreement about how to pursue the goals (Greer 
et al., 2008). Given the ambiguity of strategic goals (Sillince et al., 2012), we would expect a 
dynamic process of interaction between conflict types to shape the messy and emergent processes of 
strategy implementation as actors work out strategy (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006; Vaara & 
Whittington, 2012). Yet, despite various calls (cf. Martin & Bergmann, 1996), we still know little 
about the dynamics of conflict, particularly how conflict types interact (Greer et al., 2008). This is 
the focus of our paper in which we ask: What is the role of task and process conflict during strategy 
implementation, and what impact do they have upon the implementation process? 
Method 
Case and Data 
Consistent with our exploratory approach, we use a longitudinal, real-time case study (Yin, 
1994). We observed Telco, an infrastructure firm that just agreed a new strategy with its regulator. 
As Telco owned the industry distribution network and could give unfair monopolistic benefits to its 
Retail division, Telco agreed to separate the network into an independent business division. The 
strategy required this division, Distribution, to ensure all industry players had equal access to the 
Telco-owned network. Distribution could thus not favour Telco divisions, neither sharing 
commercial information nor allowing influence over decision-making. The strategy also required 
Telco to separate products offered through its integrated value chain to tight deadlines.  
This salient case of strategy implementation profoundly altered the business environment; the 
new strategy changed the industry and its dynamics by transforming the relationship between Telco 
and its competitors (Marcus & Geffen, 1998). It also changed the company’s integrated business 
model, challenging market-facing divisions with a differentiated industry position around high 
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customer service. Telco’s ability to respond to the new configuration determined its future success 
(Burgelman & Grove, 1996). There was conflict over strategy implementation as divisions remained 
and worked together in the same corporate structure, but had different goals. While Distribution was 
an independent industry supplier treating all customers equally, other divisions pursued market goals 
of service differentiation. Tension over strategic objectives is a common source of conflict (Marcus 
& Geffen, 1998; Pondy, 1967; Shaffer & Hillman, 2000).  
To observe strategy implementation, we conducted an 18-month study of Telco from 
inception of the regulatory strategy, tracing the separation of one Telco product, Beep, in real-time. 
Beep was important because the Retail market was based on Beep; if Beep failed, the Retail market 
failed. Beep was also complicated to separate as there was no blueprint to follow. Importance, 
complexity and novelty are associated with conflict (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Jehn, 1997). To 
access naturally-occurring data and preserve temporality, our core data comes from non-participant 
observation of implementation meetings (see Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008). These meetings were 
used to manage the implementation process and were scheduled regularly –weekly or bi-monthly – 
and attended by set attendees, largely middle-managers. We observed 130 meetings in total, of which 
70 were central meetings and 60 were divisional meetings. Functional managers attended divisional 
meetings, while divisional leads attended central meetings. Meetings were typically two hours long, 
audio-recorded, and transcribed verbatim. We took extensive notes to complement recordings. 
Avoiding bias from a single source and broaden contextual understanding (Yin, 1994), we 
also gathered 125 interviews, audio recorded and transcribed, informal on-site interaction, and 
copious documents. Interviewees were people central to the implementation process, and generally 
the same individuals participating in implementation meetings. However, we also sampled for some 
more senior and junior managers to ensure we understood the broader context and impact. 
Documents related specifically to Beep and included PowerPoint slides, reports, and e-mails. 
Analysis was iterative; the full process is summarized in Table 1 and a complementary fuller 
description can be accessed in a weblink to Appendix A2. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Findings 
In qualitative research there is always a trade-off between showing the rich data upon which 
findings are based and the constraints of an academic manuscript (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007; 
                                                 
2
 We moved the detailed description of analysis into Table 1 and will provide the full method as an electronic 
Appendix A in order to comply with journal guidelines and on advice of the managing editor. A copy of Appendix 
A is available in the letter to reviewers. 
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Golden-Biddle & Locke 2006). This trade-off is particularly pertinent in presenting incidences of 
conflict in strategy implementation, where situated activities must be analysed to expose underlying 
dynamics. We thus present findings around stages of strategy implementation, using representative 
vignettes of the interaction between process and task conflict. Vignettes progressively illustrate how 
recognizing and working through conflict helped define and implement strategy. In illustrating this 
dynamic we show that, conflict was necessary but not sufficient to advance the implementation 
process. Rather, the interaction between conflict types and actors’ ability to appropriately recognize 
and respond to both types, enabled implementation.  
 Beep had two strategic goals: Producing an equitable and functioning product by Month 10 
(BHAG), and ensuring its full consumer uptake by Month 16 (CTC). Managers described these goals 
as follows: ‘BHAG puts pressure on us; if we don’t meet the date, we’ll make a payment to other 
industry players…$5 million per month. But more than that it’s about loss of credibility…The legal 
commitment is the CTC in Month 16. All of our customers will be using Beep then, so we better 
make sure it works!’ (Retail manager3).  
Meeting these strategic goals was critical for Telco but there was no guide for what 
constituted an equitable and functioning product. Consistent with the emergent nature of strategy, 
actors had to work out this content through implementation (Sminia & de Rond, 2012). Task and 
process conflict arose as disagreements about how to implement the strategy highlighted 
disagreement about what constituted the strategy, which in turn produced further conflicts about how 
to do this. Task and process conflict thus interacted in important ways. For instance, process conflict 
could arise from task conflict, as problems with defining strategy content made it difficult to develop 
an implementation process. Yet, managers would not have recognized this and responded 
appropriately without experiencing task and process conflict. In our description, we thus focus on 
how the interaction between task and process conflict shaped definition of strategy content and 
coordination of strategy process. For each phase, we explain the task and process conflict 
dimensions, provide a vignette of their interaction in defining and implementing the goals, and 
explain the implications of conflict for strategy. 
Phase 1 (M1-4): Ambiguous strategy 
Process and task conflict were mutually reinforced the ambiguous nature of the strategy. 
Process conflict and subsequent decisions about how to approach building project plans, setting 
                                                 
3
 While we gave primacy to meeting data in our analysis, we draw upon all of our field data to present the findings. 
We thus use a combination of verbatim quotes from meeting observations and interviews to illustrate dynamics. In-
so-doing, please note that we draw on observational data unless we append the word interview. 
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timelines, and assigning roles, uncovered task conflict due to a vague understanding of task elements. 
While managers knew they needed to produce an equitable and functioning product and transfer all 
customers to that product, they did not know what equitable or functioning meant or how they could 
achieve it: ‘When we signed up to this, the reality was that it was best guess’ (Telco manager, 
interview). The strategy was thus ambiguous, producing not only task conflict but also fuelling 
process conflict as actors did not know how to interact, who to involve, and what to do to implement 
strategy; ‘Our communication wasn’t good. The tendency when you’re embattled is to run away and 
hide in a corner.’ (Distribution manager, interview). 
Interaction between conflict types. Divisional managers realised they needed to agree a 
project plan. As they debated their discrepant views about how to address this process issue, they 
recognized the underlying task issue surrounding functionality. Retail managers argued the process 
should be organized around a common project document detailing required Beep functionality: ‘The 
first thing to do is to get the document that’s got the information that you need, as opposed to trying 
to solve the issues that might then exist. So a group of people should go and build that document’ 
(Retail manager). Distribution managers favoured industry discussion about what functionality was 
needed; ‘I wasn’t aware that was an objective. My view was that this was a collaborative forum in 
which we collaborate with industry to come up with a specification’ (Distribution manager). This 
process conflict and debate around whether industry discussion or project document should come 
first spurred further recognition of task conflict: ‘That goes to show what we don’t know’ (Retail 
manager); ‘It raises a lot of issues. Some of them are product requirement issues, some of them are 
technical issues, some of them are performance issues. I hear that – But I think there’s potential 
danger that we get bogged down in the detail.’ (Distribution manager). Actions proposed and taken to 
implement the strategy thus uncovered more disagreements, not just about process but also task 
issues, i.e. task conflict about definition of product and performance requirements. With no clear way 
forward, the Retail manager returned to his earlier point: ‘The number one aim has to be to get a 
deliverable, a document. Any issue like “this is not fast enough” or “that functionality is not right” 
has to be put to one side. You’d then use the document to solve those issues’ (Retail manager). While 
what constituted a functioning product remained unclear, there was effort to progress the task by 
resolving the process disagreement about how to proceed with implementation. So, process conflict 
highlighted a specific process issue that was problematic and on which a decision needed to be made. 
Deciding on the issue facilitated implementation progress. By helping managers identify a problem, 
and taking steps to resolve it, process conflict facilitated the implementation. This focus was on 
process conflict, and subsequent actions to address strategy process issues. 
12 
Strategy implications. The task remained ambiguous with no agreed definition of equitable 
or functioning. Yet managers could progress implementation by developing mechanisms to surmount 
process conflict, creating joint programs and rules of engagement between divisions. These 
mechanisms subdued conflict and enabled actors to progress planning. However, managers did not 
deal with the basis of the task conflict; the ambiguous strategy. Without agreeing what equitable and 
functioning meant (strategy content), it was impossible to work out how to achieve this (strategy 
process). The result was sustained ambiguity and superficial implementation progress: ‘There are two 
things we need to work out: “what we are going to deliver” and “the impact on our plan of delivering 
that”…there is going to be a knock-on effect.’ (Distribution manager). Process issue responses were 
a temporary solution and task issues responses were delayed; the stage was set for further conflict. 
Phase 2 (M4-6): Progressing strategy process by ignoring ambiguity over content 
Managers advanced implementation by purposefully ignoring ambiguity over strategy 
content. Process conflict arose over how to time deliverables, uncovering task conflict about what 
was needed for a functioning and equitable product. This process conflict helped actors recognise the 
need for better interdivisional collaboration. Coordination mechanisms were introduced to surmount 
process conflict but strategy content remained vague, with few product elements defined. The 
underlying problem was thus not addressed while actors over-attended to process conflict. 
Interaction between conflict types. Attempts to hone delivery plans generated more task 
and process conflict. The product spec was central as it outlined the development plan and detailed 
the functionality available by BHAG. Managers’ reactions to the spec indicated continued task 
conflict about what features to include, stimulating process conflict about how to embed additional 
features in the existing delivery schedule. Yet, content issues remained: ‘The spec is still not agreed. 
The version that Distribution sent us was very different to the version we were working to. And some 
of the changes we expected weren’t there; only about 50% of the changes were. We’re still working 
significantly at risk.’ (Retail manager). This highlighted a content gap around what spec could be 
deemed functioning (task conflict) and a process gap around how they approached the task (process 
conflict). ‘There are 77 technical issues and 11 key customer issues that we’re trying to work through 
with Distribution. Their CEO made a commitment that the 11 customer issues would be resolved by 
Friday. That’s impossible because they’re doing feasibility work to see how the issues can be fixed. 
And they obviously can’t agree to do it until they know how they’re going to do it.’ (Retail manager). 
The way functioning was defined exacerbated process conflict: Trying to deliver more functionality 
threw up new process issues, such as running trials, which constrained efforts to agree strategy 
content. Thus, strategy process in some ways had to precede strategy content and became the 
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dominant focus: ‘The spec was released early so we could thrash out some of these issues and start 
working together’ (Distribution manager). However, Retail managers felt that they just needed to get 
on with making the spec work; ‘With all due respect, it was supposed to be published in Month 3!’ 
(Retail manager). Process conflict created by delays in producing and releasing the spec details was 
thus not a separate issue, but rather compounded the task conflict over what features would be 
offered. Process and task conflict were intertwined as managers tried to implement the strategic task 
without clarity about the strategy. However, managers’ focus on process, driven by process conflict, 
obscured this relationship and meant they did not address issues of content. 
Strategy implications. Managers sought progress by developing mechanisms that enabled 
them to request and prioritize functionality. This offered an equitable strategy process tool to 
communicate product needs between divisions, allowing actors to surmount process conflict and 
advance implementation: ‘It’s easy; we just ask for it’ (Retail manager). Process conflict thus initially 
drove the implementation by enabling managers to identify and address specific process problems, 
which uncovered the need to further define content. Strategy content was iteratively defined as actors 
responded to process conflict issues, paying little attention to task conflict. There was only marginal 
progress in determining strategy content, with equitable refined to mean appropriate access and 
functionality for all industry players. This did not eliminate the origin of task conflict, as ambiguity 
remained about what functioning meant, constraining implementation of the strategy process. 
Phase 3 (M6-10): Defining strategy content through crisis 
Process conflict became increasingly specific, centring on the inability to progress 
implementation due to task conflict about the features underpinning equitability and functionality. As 
attempts to coordinate the strategy process failed to produce real progress due to underlying strategy 
content issues, both conflict types surged. Process conflict over progress failure led to sharp task 
conflict, as actors realized they could not advance strategy process without defining strategy content: 
‘We’ve hit a wall. We can’t progress the delivery until we figure out what we are going to do!’ 
(Retail manager). As actors tried to use new implementation processes, they realized these did not 
overcome core definitional differences. Significantly, product design was deemed insufficient to 
meet market demands; Beep was failing to function: ‘This doesn’t allow us to fulfil our current 
customer contracts. That’s not what I would call a market-ready product’ (Retail manager). As 
managers tried to work out what features were sufficient to make Beep function, they recognized 
they could not deliver by BHAG, further exacerbating task conflict. Implementation was in crisis 
over ambiguous strategy content: ‘This project is a shambles’ (Retail manager). Project managers 
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called on senior managers to develop a common understanding of the strategy; ‘We are currently 
awaiting a steer from the Group CEO’ (Telco manager). 
Interaction between conflict types. As the origin of task conflict became clearer and the 
need to address it urgent, actors tried to work toward content-based solutions. This uncovered further 
conflict: ‘I see a total mismatch in how we approach this task. Some people are just trying to meet 
the deadline regardless of quality. That’s not good enough. We actually need a product that works!’ 
(Retail manager); ‘You can’t expect a perfect product on day one. That’s not how product delivery 
works...BHAG means having a working product and we are on track to deliver that. It might not be 
as elegant a solution as you would like, but it will work’ (Distribution manager). Task conflict 
continued about the functionality that had to be delivered. While some managers insisted functioning 
solely meant the product was available and being supplied, others demanded a high functionality: 
‘That’s totally unacceptable. That’s not what I call fit-for-purpose. The customer experience and 
operational procedures in Retail depend on the ability to offer functionality. That’s not happening but 
it is something we absolutely have to do. Otherwise we can’t progress. We may be able to turn Beep 
on at BHAG, but we’d have a catastrophe on our hands!’ (Retail manager). By explaining that the 
implementation process had not enabled them to work out Beep’s functionality, Retail emphasized 
they had a content and process crisis, in which ‘no current plan indicates that we can make BHAG!’ 
(Retail manager). Unable to progress the task, the implementation broke down. Senior managers 
intervened and helped overcome task conflict by defining the strategy. They clarified that a 
functioning product had to satisfy consumer demand by ‘meeting or exceeding’ quality levels of 
comparable products; this meant more features. The BHAG deadline was forsaken to facilitate this: 
‘The exec has decided that the current product is insufficient to be used by BHAG and has made it 
clear what we need to deliver in order for the product to go live’ (Telco manager); ‘If we tried to 
meet BHAG, the result would be a bad customer experience, possibly a service crisis and meltdown. 
The CEO agreed to a delay but made it very clear that he regards this as a failure.’ (Retail manager). 
Strategy implications. Strong focus on how to manage the implementation (strategy 
process), driven by high levels of process conflict, had waylaid the task by preventing managers from 
defining the core task (strategy content). Managers had deferred response to task issues, initially 
ignoring task conflict, in favour of process-based responses. They thus became stuck in a cycle of 
experiencing and responding to process conflict. When actors recognized the need to address content 
issues and tried to respond, it was too late: There was no feasible plan to get to BHAG and Telco had 
to pay a cumulative fine until it delivered on BHAG. This breakdown disrupted the process, forcing 
managers to confront the underlying problem; they had not resolved task conflict about what the 
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strategy was. Senior managers were called in to help define strategy content, prioritizing clarity about 
functionality. The outcome was a clear definition of strategy content; senior managers defined what 
was meant by functioning and gave achieving this primacy over the deadline. Task conflict subsided, 
enabling managers to advance the implementation; ‘The exec worked with us to agree a solution. If 
that hadn’t happened, we would really have struggled. That was breaking through the barrier...but it 
meant we didn’t actually start implementing the solution until the beginning of Month 10’ (Retail 
manager, interview). Hence, the breakdown occasioned by failing to recognize the task-based origin 
of much conflict ultimately forced a breakthrough in defining the strategy content, which had been 
ambiguous throughout the implementation. This breakdown and breakthrough, while costly for 
Telco, allowed them to understand the strategy content and progress its implementation. 
Phase 4 (M10-13): Making the defined strategy work 
Defining strategy content led to more specific process conflict about how to deliver content. 
Telco was paying a hefty monthly fine for failing BHAG and needed to deliver. Defining the strategy 
reduced ambiguity and prevented much task conflict, but process conflict increased as actors worked 
out how to achieve the agreed strategy. This spurred very specific task conflict about minor delivery 
elements: With strategy content better defined, actors could coordinate the strategy process.  
Interaction between conflict types. Working out how to design and include new features 
within tight timescales, surfaced process conflict over how to best progress. This uncovered minor 
task conflict about the detail of specific functionality, including the ability to satisfy transfer 
requirements. As each detail was better understood, it was integrated into the process, creating 
opportunity for further process conflict: ‘It’s getting back to the age-old debate; it’s not just about 
what we’ve agreed, but also how we’ve agreed to do it’ (Distribution manager). For example, as 
managers tried to deliver a functional product, they realized it was intertwined with testing. They 
needed the process of testing to achieve the outcome of functionality, jeopardising the final CTC 
goal: ‘We are very concerned about the lack of stability in the testing platform. That’s going to knock 
our transfer plan back...these problems are going to affect other areas.’ (Retail manager). Thus, 
efforts to implement defined product features uncovered additional process conflict; e.g. delivery 
mode changes were needed: ‘It is an entire change of systems and that means teething problems... not 
only systems but process and product changes. We mitigate as much as we can but obviously you’re 
always going to get something that upsets the applecart’ (Distribution manager). Process conflict 
about how best to proceed remained: ‘Any changes will have a big impact. Why are we still making 
changes this late in the game?’ (Retail manager); ‘I really don’t know what the best way forward is!’ 
(Distribution manager); ‘Our program is deteriorating and loss of testing time is a constraint. The 
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imperative is to start using Beep ASAP but we’re running out of time’ (Retail manager). 
Implementation was a process of working out how to deliver the strategy, involving iteration between 
process and content, often via conflict, to achieve sufficient clarity to progress. 
Strategy implications. While the strategy content was now clear, actors still faced major 
work in deciding how to implement the strategy (strategy process). As they developed and released 
product features, process issues like how to use ICT systems to deliver new features emerged. 
Actions to address these issues spurred some task conflict, drawing attention to the need to refine 
nuances of strategy content, e.g. agreeing specific characteristics of product features. This iteration 
between strategy process and content, enabled increasing strategy implementation. Process tools like 
delivery groups, project dashboards, and early-testing helped to surmount process conflict and 
advance implementation. Actors delivered the features necessary for a functioning product and 
satisfied BHAG requirements. While late and not perfect, it was successful: ‘Given the situation, it 
was a pretty good delivery...even when we met BHAG, there was still functionality missing, but 
there was no major service crisis.’ (Telco manager, interview).  
Phase 5 (M13-18): Achieving strategy implementation 
In this phase, conflict was much decreased, focusing on very specific issues. With a clear 
definition of strategy content and a viable strategy process emerging, managers focused on minor 
refinements while working toward CTC: ‘Once we get the customers transferred, we can move Beep 
into business-as-usual.’ (Telco manager). 
Interaction between conflict types. As actors moved toward CTC and started transfers, they 
uncovered process disagreement about how and when to progress: ‘I don’t think we can start mass 
transfer on Thursday because we won’t even have tested the transfer feature!’ (Retail manager). 
Actions to address process conflict around transfer targets led to task conflict; different transfer plans 
had different milestones and functionality. For instance, managers disagreed about deadlines for 
specific transfer features: ‘If you ask why we can’t do it sooner, the main rub is the capability to 
develop this alongside the product. We hope this will go live for testing in M14; then it better meet 
expectations!’ (Retail manager). Working through these issues, managers noted other disagreements, 
like task conflict around the definition of transfer and what completion meant: ‘CTC literally means 
“customer transfer complete”. That means we have to transfer all customers by the deadline’ 
(Distribution manager); ‘All customers that can be transferred. Obviously there’ll be some customers 
that we won’t be able to transfer.’ (Retail manager). They also disagreed about numbers: ‘The 
number of residual customers is rapidly rising and now far exceeds what we predicted...we need to 
get this back on track’ (Distribution manager); ‘We need to contextualize this...the number looks big, 
17 
but it’s actually less than 5% of our total volume. You have got to remember that we’ve transferred 
millions of customers; so a few thousand customers are insignificant’ (Retail manager). Customer 
transfers not only raised process conflict about how to transfer customers but also task conflict about 
what constituted success: ‘There has been disagreement about what is necessary to do mass transfer... 
the core issue seem to be how soon we can move to volume’ (Retail manager). These issues were 
intertwined; decisions about task content had implications for task process and vice versa. Conflict 
drove identification of the issues and decisions that became focal points. Thus, conflict, where 
properly identified and responded to, had generative effects on the emergent strategy process. 
Strategy implications. Moving toward meeting the final goal, managers focused on strategy 
process by coordinating activity to meet CTC: ‘Yesterday we declared customer transfer complete.’ 
(Telco manager). The only minor refinement to strategy content was the definition of full product 
uptake. It was defined to include the entire customer base, apart from few unique cases that became 
stuck during the transfer process and required additional time to be moved. At CTC, Telco had 
implemented a major shift in the product base of the retail market, in the process emerging a clear 
definition of the strategy and the way to achieve it. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
These implementation phases, during which increasingly clear definitions of strategy content 
and process emerged, are summarized in Table 3. Task and process conflict were central to strategy 
implementation. While conflict itself was not generative, it directed managers’ attention to critical 
issues requiring resolution. Managers’ ability to understand and address content and process issues 
appropriately, including acknowledging the relationship between these, enabled managers to 
incrementally work out what the strategy was and how to implement it. Specifically, managers 
experienced process conflict as they developed mechanisms to advance strategic goals. Efforts to 
respond to this process conflict highlighted disagreement over what the goals were and generated 
micro task-conflicts. Task and process conflict were thus iterative and recursive (see Figure 2). 
Findings also suggest that task conflict in Phase 3 generated a breakthrough in defining strategy 
content. This impasse was critical in raising awareness that strategy content was still ambiguous and 
constituted a barrier to implementation. Actors could not make real progress on task or process until 
they agreed quite specific strategy elements. Responding to task conflict was necessary for strategy 
content to be sufficiently defined for managers to focus on specific implementation actions. Yet, this 
was also not without conflict. As actors focused on strategy process, they exposed disagreement 
about how to advance specific tasks, resulting in more process conflict. Telco implemented the 
intended strategy in a messy and emergent way that required it to continuously revise its 
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understandings of the strategy and how to execute it. Our case shows that iteration between strategy 
content and process is a necessary part of implementation; it offers an important feedback loop that 
ensures implementation is aligned with the emerging strategy content. Conflict is critical in 
highlighting problematic issues that need to be addressed. Yet, addressing these issues is not 
straightforward, as strategy process and content, like process and task conflict, are entwined in 
practice, difficult to entangle, and hard to address. This helps to explain why strategy implementation 
is so complicated and can often lead to unintended consequences (Balogun & Johnson, 2005), inertia 
(Jarzabkowski, 2008; Johnson, 1988) and even failure (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2003). 
Discussion 
This paper examines the role of task and process conflict in strategy implementation. Our 
findings identify a recursive micro-process of interaction between task and process conflict within 
which strategy emerges and is implemented. Thus, we conceptualize the interaction between task and 
process conflict as an explanatory mechanism for how strategy content emerges within, shapes, and 
is shaped by implementation. While not claiming that conflict is generative, we explain that conflict 
can have generative effects when managers correctly recognize and respond to it; this requires 
acknowledging the link between task and process conflict, and iteratively working through the issues 
it exposes. This informs our theorizing, summarized in two conceptual models below. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 2 demonstrates the recursive association between task and process conflict central to 
our study. Managers’ experience of and response to one type of conflict necessarily impacts their 
experience of and response to the other. This interaction shapes both strategy content and strategy 
process in an incremental, emergent way. As indicated by the arrows in the model, conflict iteratively 
shapes strategy by directing managerial focus and enabling recursive switching between ill-defined 
elements of strategy process and content. Thus, task conflict occurs when some element of the 
strategy content is ambiguous, prompting actors to define micro-elements of the strategy. Process 
conflict occurs when actors experience disagreement about how to make the strategy work, 
stimulating coordination activities. 
Responding to task conflict over different understandings about quite specific strategy 
elements, managers generate an increasingly shared definition of strategy. This is emergent as many 
elements of strategy content are unclear and cannot be anticipated in advance; they are defined as 
they arise from interaction between task and process conflict. Simultaneously, as actors try to make 
the strategy work, they find which actors and activities need to be coordinated to implement their 
current understanding of the strategy. Again, this is emergent; process conflict arises as actors realise 
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they do not have a sufficiently common strategy definition to identify processes necessary for 
achieving it. Process conflict thus shows which elements of strategy content remain too ambiguous to 
implement, generating task conflict that further stimulates definition of the strategy content. As our 
conceptual model shows, strategy is implemented via association of strategy process and content. 
The micro-process of experiencing and responding to numerous small task and process conflicts 
underpins the process of strategy implementation illustrated in Figure 3. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Actors go through recursive cycles of task and process conflict as they implement an 
ambiguous and emergent strategy (Figure 3). In our study, initial progress in Phases 1 and 2 
improved coordination of the strategy process without defining strategy content (see dotted arrow 
from process to task conflict). This overemphasis on strategy process, driven by an unbalanced focus 
on process conflict (shown with bold, underlined text), proved unsustainable as strategy content was 
too ambiguous to enable further implementation. Actors thus reached a crisis point in Phase 3 
(indicated by broken arrows); the strategy process could not move forward as actors did not have an 
agreed definition of strategy content. Rather, the previously neglected task conflict dominated 
(indicated by bold, underlined text), requiring actors to focus on and deal with strategy content 
ambiguity. This breakdown indicates that recognition of and willingness to respond to task conflict as 
soon as it arises is critical. Otherwise, actors become ‘stuck’ in a cycle of responding only to process 
conflict by addressing process-based problems, essentially ignoring the need for fundamental 
redefinition of the strategy content highlighted by task conflict. Thus, while task conflict can have a 
generative effect in prompting actors to address ambiguity and work through specific strategy 
elements highlighted by conflict, it can constrain and even lead to breakdown in strategy 
implementation when its interaction with process conflict is ignored. Hence, the recursive 
relationship between conflict types and strategy process and content is critical. Without sufficiently 
common definitions of the strategy, implementation cannot progress, as actors do not know what to 
implement. Actors need to respond to both process and task conflict to advance implementation. As 
we show, even when actors arrive at some common understanding of strategy content, 
implementation still raises further conflict as experiencing and responding to process conflict 
highlights ongoing elements of strategy content needing clarification. Interaction between strategy 
process and content during strategy implementation is spurred by actors’ experience of and responses 
to task and process conflict. Only when recognizing this, managers can balance task and process 
conflict sufficiently to progress implementation (indicated by regular font and solid arrows). It is thus 
critical for managers to understand the recursive association between task and process conflict in 
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strategy implementation: If managed appropriately, conflict enables actors to iterate between strategy 
process and content, working out what the strategy is and how to make it work in practice.  
Contributions 
Our conceptual model of the role of conflict in strategy implementation contributes to the 
strategizing literature. First, we demonstrate how middle managers actively define strategy by 
identifying and defining specific elements of strategy content through responses to task and process 
conflict. As most strategies are ambiguous (Sillince et al, 2012), these micro-details of how an 
intended strategy is worked out through implementation are critical in the emergence of common 
understandings of strategy. While middle managers may not ‘formulate’ strategy, they fill strategy 
content with meaning and action by defining its micro-elements. This provides deeper understanding 
of how strategy emerges and is realized through fluctuating human dynamics. 
Further, our focus on the interaction between task and process conflict, and the responses 
managers formulate to address conflict, extends knowledge of the generative mechanisms through 
which middle managers provide impetus to the strategy process. Studies of emerging strategies focus 
on generative mechanisms such as championing, forcing (Burgelman, 1983a), experimenting, and 
adjusting (Régner 2003). While Régner notes that conflict is important in this process, because it 
enables middle managers to sharpen arguments and mobilize energy, he views conflict as a process 
outcome. By contrast, studying conflict during implementation of intended strategy, we show that 
conflict critically underpins the identification of specific elements of strategy content and process by 
directing managerial attention. Rather than simply being an outcome, if managed appropriately, 
conflict can have generative effects in underpinning mechanisms others have found. For example, we 
might better understand championing and forcing (Burgelman, 1983a) as activities fuelled by task 
conflict, and experimenting and adjusting (Regnér, 2003) as activities fuelled by process conflict, or 
arising from a combination of task and process conflict. Further studies adopting our granular 
approach might show different conflict types underpinning different strategic responses. A micro-
view of conflict may also help us better understand resistance (Courpasson et al, 2013), politics 
(Whittle et al, 2013) and tensions (Jarzabkowski et al, 2013). 
Our process model may also explain different paths of strategizing. For example, where 
strategy failure has been attributed to different political interests (e.g. Maitlis & Lawrence, 2003; 
Sillince & Mueller, 2007) that waylay implementation of the strategy (e.g. Guth & Macmillan, 1986), 
future research might examine whether the strategy process has become stuck in a cycle of 
inadequately defined strategy content. If so, task conflict will be prevalent and needs response. 
However, if task conflict is not adequately diagnosed, actors may engage in process conflict and 
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become frustrated trying to implement the strategy whilst ignoring definitional problems. Our case 
showed this dynamic temporarily in Phase 3, potentially explaining tendencies toward strategic drift 
(e.g. Johnson, 1988), in which actors focus on existing processes, so neglecting alignment between 
these processes and strategy content. An appreciation of the iterative association between task and 
process conflict is critical in highlighting where actors lack a common strategy definition, helping a 
definition to emerge, and working out ways to implement that definition. In short, process and task 
conflict in combination indicate that something is not working in implementation and that this cannot 
be resolved by simply improving process or content issues, but that both need to be addressed 
simultaneously. It is important for firms to understand conflict type, what this indicates, and that this 
might be recursively entwined with and indicative of another form of conflict. 
While our main contributions are to the strategy literature, our findings also elaborate the 
conflict literature. First, our process model illuminates the recursive relationship between task 
conflict and process conflict. Our study underscores the close correlation between task and process 
conflict reported in the literature. A recent meta-analysis aggregating correlations across studies 
suggests that the association ranges between .44 and .90. (De Wit et al., 2012). While some authors 
argue this may be due to overlap in definition and measurement (cf. Befahr et al., 2011), our findings 
support an alternative explanation: Task and process conflict underpin one another (see also Greer et 
al., 2008). We show that, rather than one type of conflict simply morphing into or stimulating 
another type (cf. Jehn, 1997), the relationship between task and process conflict evolves in a series of 
recursive loops, with conflict types continuously informing one another. We propose that this is 
because defining task content and process is an incremental process, which actors have to work 
through iteratively. We show the different responses that managers make to the conflict they face. 
Our findings thus offer a more fluid and dynamic conceptualisation of conflict and emphasize the 
need for dynamic research methods that go beyond cross-sectional studies to advance understanding 
(Jehn & Bendersky, 2003) and generate insight into the relationships between conflict types. 
Second, while many studies see process conflict as predominantly negative (De Wit et al., 
2012), our study of strategy implementation, focusing on middle managers, suggests process conflict 
may also play an important role in implementing tasks. Process conflict directs managerial attention 
to process-based issues, enabling actors to advance implementation in the absence of a clear 
definition of content. This is a common strategy problem, as content is worked out as it is 
implemented in practice. While middle managers may be more prone to process conflict as their 
tasks inherently involve logistics and their roles provide authority over implementation activities, our 
results show that this does not exempt them from task conflict, which must be addressed for effective 
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implementation. We thus show how task conflict, via its link with process conflict, is one of the ways 
that middle managers influence tasks and their definition, even if this is not their original remit 
(Mantere & Vaara, 2008). For conflict to have this generative effect, managers need to understand 
the incremental nature of the strategy process and respond to conflict as an indicator that something 
in either the task or process is problematic, rather than pushing harder on an existing process, or 
insisting on a particular definition of the task, without understanding ramifications for the other. 
Future research should study this relationship between task and process conflict and examine how to 
minimize its negative consequences whilst harnessing its generative effects in implementation.  
This paper responds to calls for strategy research to furnish new insight into the micro-
processes underpinning strategizing by refocusing on implementation (Tsoukas, 2010; Vaara & 
Whittington, 2012) and the association between strategy process and content (Sminia & de Rond, 
2012). We illuminate the human dynamics that underlie strategizing, pointing to task and process 
conflict as critical mechanisms enabling actors to complete implementation. Our findings are 
generated from a single case in which managers, because of regulation, were required to implement 
the strategy or face overt penalties. This is thus a bounded context and we do not claim empirical 
generalizability. However, as firms in other contexts also face decline or financial consequences from 
failure to implement strategy (e.g. Johnson, 1988; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2003), our results have wider 
theoretical application. Further, we studied changes typical for regulated firms in OECD countries 
(Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Kay & Vickers, 1988; Young, 2001). Our findings are thus relevant in other 
regulated firms. We expect our models to provide grounds for future research on how the dynamic 
interaction between conflict types shapes strategy implementation and strategizing.
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Table 1. Iterative Stages of Data Analysis 
Stage Analytical Activities Output 
1. Develop thick descriptions to 
generate initial insights 
1. Generate thick descriptions of Telco case  
2. Share descriptions with informants to improve trustworthiness  
 1 thick description identifying two key strategic goals: 
i. Big Hairy Audacious Goal (BHAG): equitable and 
functioning product by Month 10 
ii. Customer Transfer Complete (CTC): full uptake of 
equitable and functioning product by Month 16 
 
2. Code observational data to 
identify conflict 
1. Define conflict as incompatibility, discrepancy or disagreement between individuals or 
groups in relation to goals, processes and relationships (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008; 
Jehn & Bendersky, 2003) 
2. Develop rigorous coding scheme for task and process conflict using existing survey 
measures and qualitative assessments of conflict (cf. Table 2) to develop synonym-lists 
(Jehn, 1995), behavioural cues (Jehn, 1997; Pondy, 1967) like changes in inflection 
(broken or high pitch speech), emotive word usage (using mean, crass or emotion-
invoking words), volume (raised voices or yelling), and physical gestures (like banging 
a fist on the table) 
3. Prepare data for coding by treating each specific incident of conflict as a datum; 
incidents ranged from three sentences to two paragraphs (cf. Armstrong et al, 1997) 
4. Code data using this coding scheme 
5. Confirm coding scheme and data classification (Clark et al, 2010; Dutton et al, 2001; 
Guler, 2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) 
i. Examining how participants referred to specific incidents or experiences of 
conflict in our interview data  
ii. Using multiple coders to verify accuracy: code 10% of the data to check 
consistency (71% agreement), discuss areas of ambiguity and discrepancy to 
reach full agreement & clarify coding scheme, code a second random sample of 
10% of data (91% agreement), discuss areas of ambiguity and disagreement to 
reach full agreement.  
iii. Training graduate student to code each datum and flag up any queries; 5% of 
data recoded through this process 
 
 Identify conflict in meeting data 
i. 115 conflict incidents relating to Beep  Conflict data coded to task and process conflict 
ii. 19 task conflicts 
iii. 96 process conflicts  Verified coded data  
3. Map conflict patterns over 
time to identify conflict 
dynamics 
1. Conduct monthly frequency counts of task and process conflict  
2. Graphically display conflict patterns (cf. Figure 1) as early indicator of variability (see 
Jehn, 1995, 1997) 
3. Identify interpretive trends in variability (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Langley, 1999) 
 
 Conflict patterns: Task and process conflict followed almost 
identical patterns of waxing and waning over time  Rich narrative of patterns, focusing on the relationship between 
task and process conflict  
 
4. Examine evolution of strategic 
task to seek evidence of how 
task & process conflict impact 
the implementation of Beep  
1. Revisit conflict data to see how conflict unfolded and how strategy implementation 
progressed to identify relationship between the two: responding to task conflict helped 
actors identify ambiguities & problems in strategy content (= refine what the strategy 
task is); responding to process conflict helped actors identify ambiguities & problems 
in strategy process (= refine how they might best accomplish the strategy task) 
 Five stages of implementation: (1) ambiguous strategy, (2) 
progressing strategy process by ignoring content ambiguity, (3) 
defining strategy content via crisis, (4) making the defined 
strategy work, and (5) achieving implementation.   Model of the relationship between conflict and strategy 
implementation 
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Table 2. Conflict Coding Scheme 
Type Sources Definition Subtypes Examples 
Task 
Conflict 
 
Amason & Sapienza (1997); Amason 
& Schweiger (1994); Amason (1996); 
Behfar et al (2008, 2011); Behfar et 
al (2011); Bendersky & Hays (2012); 
Cronin & Weingart (2007); De Dreu 
& Beersma (2005); De Wit et al 
(2012); Greer & Jehn (2007); Greer et 
al (2008); Jehn & Bendersky (2003); 
Jehn & Mannix (2001); Jehn (1994, 
1995, 1997); Jehn et al (1999, 2008); 
Pelled (1996); Pelled et al (1999); 
Priem et al (1995); Rahim (2002); 
Shaw et al (2011); Weingart (1992) 
Task-oriented 
disagreement 
about task 
content and 
outcomes, i.e. 
what the task is 
 
Task content: Disagreement 
over the task definition, nature 
of the task, or what the task is 
Task outcomes: Disagreement 
over task outputs and deliveries, 
ends of task accomplishment, 
relevant, or what we need to 
achieve 
- Disagreement on the goal of a project  
- Different key performance indicators  
- Disagreement about key outputs 
- Divergent benchmarks 
  
Process 
Conflict 
Behfar et al (2008, 2011); Bendersky 
& Hays (2012); De Wit et al (2012); 
Greer & Jehn (2007); Greer et al 
(2008); Jehn & Bendersky (2003); 
Jehn & Mannix (2001); Jehn (1997); 
Jehn et al (1999, 2008); Shaw et al 
(2011); Weingart (1992) 
Task-oriented 
disagreement 
about the task 
process, i.e. how 
the task should 
be approached 
Responsibility: Disagreement 
over assignment of tasks and 
responsibilities 
Procedures: Disagreement over 
tools or techniques for task 
accomplishment 
Scheduling & time 
management: Disagreement 
over planning of tasks and 
timelines, as well as ability to 
meet these 
Contribution: Disagreements 
over workload, effort, 
commitment and engagement 
- Differences re who should do what (roles & boundaries) 
- Disagreement about how to assign or delegate tasks 
- Divergence on how to engage/interact/share information 
- Withholding information necessary for the group tasks 
- Absence of mutual assistance and cooperation 
- Disagreement about scheduling/timing of project 
- Disagreement about scheduling/timing of key tasks  
- Divergent opinion about best action, policy or procedure 
- Serving own interests at the expense of others 
- Disagreement about allocation of resource 
- Inequity of workload, effort, commitment 
- Inability to deliver on agreed deadlines 
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Table 3. Summary of the Relationship between Conflict and Strategy 
Phase Conflict Representative illustrations of conflict micro-process Implications for Implementing Strategy 
Phase 1: 
Strategy is 
Ambiguous  
 
 
General Task Conflict (Med) 
Conflict about the meaning of the two key 
task elements, equitable and functionality, 
such as disagreement about what aspects of 
functionality constitutes key deliverables.  
 
General Process Conflict (High) 
Conflict about how to approach the task, 
such as who should be involved and how 
to align project plans.  
Task conflict about how much focus should be placed on functionality 
requested by Retail: ಫಫThereಬs a big gap. Retail want a lot more than we 
are prepared to deliver. Some of their demands are quite inequitableಬ 
(Distribution manager); ಫWeಬre in a unique position. Weಬre only one with 
a historic relationship with Distribution and weಬre a scale operator… that 
means ಫindustry standardಬ is not good enough for us!ಬ (Retail manager). 
 
Process conflict about how to assign responsibility, and design and align 
project plans: ಫThey had a planning meeting and didnಬt invite us. What 
kind of planning session is that?ಬ (Retail manager); ಫIt wouldnಬt be fair to 
engage with you in that way. Whether you like it or not, we can only 
share information that weಬre also ready to share with industry.ಬ 
(Distribution manager). 
Attempts to coordinate implementation spark process 
conflict, which reveals that the strategy is ambiguous: 
They cannot specify processes because do not know 
what constitutes an equitable or functioning product.  
 
Outcome: Some progress on strategy process through 
development of coordinating mechanisms, but no 
progress on strategy content. 
Phase 2: 
Progressing 
strategy process 
by ignoring 
ambiguity over 
content 
General Task Conflict (Low) 
Conflict about the two key task elements: 
equitable and functionality. Included 
debate about what constituted key 
deliveries and disagreement about the 
meaning and weighting of task elements. 
 
Specific Process Conflict (Med) 
Conflict about how to approach specific 
task elements, such as when to deliver 
certain elements in order to attain 
acceptable functionality by the deadline.  
Task conflict about whether to focus on equity or function. While equity 
meant designing a product that could meet minimum industry standards, 
functionality was about maximizing service: ಫSome of the features arenಬt 
going to be there by BHAG. Thatಬs the nature of a fair processಬ 
(Distribution manager); ಫThe problem with the proposal is the customer 
experience. We need to agree the quality criteria for a functioning 
productಬ (Retail manager). 
 
Process conflict about how to engage equitably, how much information 
could be shared, and details of the delivery schedule: ಫIf we are actually 
going to use the functionality, we need it by Month 6 so we have time to 
test it.ಬ (Retail manager); ಫWe canಬt give it to you then. We have a lot of 
other functionality to include before BHAG and cramming anything else 
in would jeopardize our existing commitments.ಬ (Distribution manager). 
Further implementation efforts lead to more focused 
process conflict as actors try to coordinate actors and 
activities, despite ambiguity about what the strategy 
is. Specifically, as people disagree about how to 
approach strategy implementation, they expose a lack 
of common understanding about the strategic 
requirements for functionality.  
 
Outcome: Some progress on strategy process through 
development of further coordination mechanisms, but 
only marginal progress on strategy content, with a 
few product features agreed. 
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Phase 3: 
Defining strategy 
content through 
crisis  
Specific Task Conflict (Med) 
Conflict about specifics of the two task 
elements, equitable and functionality, 
reach a crisis point; there is no agreement 
about the core features of Beep or about 
the meaning and weighting of different 
elements and their deliverables. 
 
Specific Process Conflict (Low) 
Conflict about how to approach the task 
when they have no agreement over what it 
is, leads to a cessation of process, which 
also generates conflict over lack of 
progress. 
Task conflict about what constituted functionality, particularly as current 
product features leave Telco unable to satisfy customer contracts: ಫOne 
month until the deadline and we still donಬt have consensus with 
Distribution on what the BHAG acceptance criteria should be!ಬ (Retail 
manager); ಫHow the hell are we going to get this project done if we canಬt 
even agree on what weಬre doing?ಬ (Distribution manager).  
 
Process conflict about the failure to progress, as different definitions of 
the task obstruct design of processes for attaining it: ಫSometimes whole 
paragraphs are removed from reports. Weಬll see what the scope of that 
job was but donಬt get to see the finding or the detailed work. I have to 
absolutely emphasize that we need to see what the scope and the 
methodology is. Otherwise, we canಬt fit it into our Beep delivery plansಬ 
(Retail manager).  
Implementation ceases as actors cannot coordinate a 
strategy on which they have no common 
understanding. Task conflict surges as actors realize 
that the lack of agreement has jeopardized the BHAG 
goal. The ensuing crisis focuses them on defining 
what functionality means. 
 
Outcome: No progress on strategy process is possible 
without agreement on strategy content. With senior 
management involvement, strategy content is defined 
quite specifically as a set of core product features that 
must be incorporated. 
Phase 4: 
Making the 
defined strategy 
work  
 
Specific Task Conflict (Low) 
Conflict about specifics of the two task 
elements, equitable and functionality, is 
decreasing and focuses on specific 
characteristics of core features and their 
deliverables. 
 
Specific Process Conflict (Med) 
Conflict about how to approach newly 
defined task elements arises as actors must 
work out how and when to deliver 
specified core features. 
Task conflict about the specific detail of agreed product features and 
how much these features had to deliver: ಫThere are specific issues around 
Beep functionality that we need agreement on. Like the fault 
functionality; that needs to be improved. Itಬs not enough to say there is a 
fault. We need to see why itಬs there.ಬ (Retail manager).  
 
Process conflict about how to produce the needed functionality; this 
included debate on timelines and ways to collaborate: ಫItಬs about input 
from Distribution. Weಬre quite disappointed in terms of progress. Itಬs not 
just about finding a better time plan to wrap around it. Weಬre actually 
getting back to making a plan for the plan!ಬ (Retail manager). 
Great clarity over the strategy content eliminates 
much task conflict, but exacerbates process conflict 
as focus shifts to implementation and how to make 
strategy work. Specifically, actors have different 
views on how to coordinate activity, which in turn, 
leads to the identification and resolution of a few 
remaining ambiguities about the strategy. 
 
Outcome: Progress on strategy process moves rapidly 
due to agreement on strategy content and the need to 
redress the missed BHAG. In the process, there are 
some minor refinements of strategy content. 
Phase 5: 
Achieving 
strategy 
implementation  
 
Specific Task Conflict (Low) 
Conflict about specifics of the two task 
elements, equitable and functionality is 
minimal and focused on specific 
definitions of the deliverables.  
 
Specific Process Conflict (Low) 
Conflict about how to approach defined 
task elements persists as actors work out 
the remaining aspects of implementation. 
Task conflict about the specific functionality needed to enable customer 
transfer by CTC and what features were required to facilitate mass 
transfer: ಫWe need that feature for transferಬ (Retail manager) – ಫI donಬt 
see how that is a transfer capability featureಬ (Distribution manager).  
 
Process conflict about how and when to meet CTC. This included how 
and when to increase volume; when transfer tools were needed; and how 
to share plans and information: ಫThe volume coming through is much 
lower than expected. We need to speed up if we are going to meet CTC.ಬ 
(Distribution manager); ಫA lot of customers we transfer end up stuck. 
Things are going wrong, so we need to inspect what is going on there. 
That means turning the volume back downಬ (Retail manager). 
As implementation nears completion focus is on the 
specific remaining elements of coordination 
necessary to meet the CTC goal. Conflict is generally 
reduced and, when it does occur, is very specific and 
focuses on key operational detail. 
 
Outcome: Progress on strategy process, as they meet 
key milestones and, finally, the CTC deadline. 
During this final process, minor aspects of the 
strategy content, such as specific product features, are 
refined.  
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Figure 1. Pattern of task and process conflict over time 
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Figure 2. Process model of conflict underpinning strategy implementation 
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Figure 3. Cumulative process model of conflict underpinning strategy implementation 
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